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Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis something, nothing;
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
1
And makes me poor indeed.
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the inception of the United States, the relationship
between government and religion may be best characterized as a
balancing act. The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution unequivocally affirms an individual’s right to exercise
his religion; yet, at the same time, it forbids the government from
favoring one religion over another or favoring religion over non2
religion. Although some have recognized the seemingly
paradoxical nature of the combination of the Free Exercise and
3
Establishment clauses, government and religion have, for the most
4
part, coexisted comfortably.
The United States has thrived as a nation that respects both
the law of the land and one’s right to practice religion. However,
the law of the United States and the teachings of one’s religion can,
5
at times, be at odds. And while the judiciary generally precludes
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. There is, of course, considerable debate as to how
these clauses should be interpreted—particularly how the Establishment Clause
should be interpreted. See infra Section II.A.1.
3. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) (“While the two Clauses
express complementary values, they often exert conflicting pressures.”); see also
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970) (“The Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend
to clash with the other.”).
4. See Developments in the Law—Religion and the State: II. The Complex
Interaction Between Religion and Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1612–19
(1987).
5. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)
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itself from adjudicating matters of an ecclesiastical nature, religion
6
cannot always evade the authority of secular law.
7
The First Amendment also protects freedom of speech. While
many have touted the benefits of a populace that promotes free
8
speech, certain types of speech have been deemed unworthy of the
9
First Amendment’s protections. The Supreme Court has, with
10
qualification, rejected the notion that defamatory statements
11
should be constitutionally protected. There is, after all, great
12
value in one’s name and reputation.
(holding that a provision of the Affordable Care Act, as applied to for-profit
closely held corporations, substantially burdened the free exercise of religion);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from compelling an Amish student
to attend public school until the age of sixteen).
6. See infra Section IV.A.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”).
8. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously likened freedom of speech to
“free trade in ideas,” otherwise known as the “marketplace” of ideas. Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”). Holmes’
contention—that the truth will ultimately prevail when presented with competing
ideas—was evidently inspired by the writings of John Milton and John Stuart Mill.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 98 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics
1988) (1859) (“He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.”);
Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2
(1984).
9. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect statements deemed to be “true threats”); New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (proscribing child pornography);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (limiting speech that is directed to
incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action).
10. The Supreme Court has navigated the difficult realm of defamation by
requiring different standards of proof based on the status of the victim and
content of the statement. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (not requiring plaintiff to prove damages unless state law
so requires when plaintiff is a private individual and matter is not of public
concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (requiring private
plaintiff to prove falsity, fault as determined by the state, and actual damages when
a statement implicates a matter of public concern); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public figure plaintiff to prove
falsity and actual malice).
11. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There
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In Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran of Unaltered Augsburg
13
Confession, religious authority and civil law met at a crossroads. A
church’s right to autonomy stood at odds with a defamation
victim’s right to a remedy. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
a religious actor is not liable for statements that are made in the
context of a church disciplinary proceeding when they are
14
disseminated only to members of the church. The majority found
that adjudicating a defamation claim in this context would
excessively entangle the court with religion and therefore violate
15
the First Amendment. Because the court did not apply neutral
principles of law, which allow a court to adjudicate claims without
touching religious doctrine, and because the court did not address
the defamation claim on a statement-by-statement basis, its decision
16
gave great deference to religious institutions.
This Note begins by exploring the history and evolution of the
17
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in the United States, including
18
its current status in Minnesota. It then discusses the facts and
procedure of Pfeil and outlines the rationale for the majority and
19
dissenting opinions. Next, it analyzes the court’s decision and
argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court ignored its own
guidelines and extended the scope of the ecclesiastical abstention

are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”).
12. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart noted that the protection of one’s reputation reflects the “essential
dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty.” Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 1.
13. 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016).
14. Id. at 542.
15. Id.
16. Id. (“Ultimately, adjudicating Pfeils’ claims would . . . unduly interfere
with respondents’ constitutional right to make autonomous decisions regarding
the governance of their religious organization.”).
17. Ecclesiastical abstention is a judicial doctrine—originating from the First
Amendment—that “forbids courts from inquiring into religious doctrine, belief,
discipline, or faith in order to resolve disputes over church property, church
polity, or church administration.” Shea Sisk Wellford, Note, Tort Actions Against
Churches—What Protections Does the First Amendment Provide?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 193,
194 (1994).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
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doctrine to a level beyond what United States Supreme Court
20
jurisprudence requires. Finally, it concludes that the Pfeil holding
essentially gives a religious actor an absolute privilege to defame in
21
church disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, this Note suggests
that the court should have used neutral principles of law, without
invoking the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, to determine which
statements could be adjudicated.
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
A.

Establishment Clause

To fully understand the nature of the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine, it is necessary to examine its roots in the First
Amendment. In Minnesota, this means taking a closer look at the
22
Establishment Clause.
1.

Competing Philosophies

The proper interpretation and meaning of the Establishment
23
Clause is a topic that is subject to considerable academic debate.
Soon after the inception of the First Amendment, some—most
notably Thomas Jefferson—advocated for a “wall of separation
24
between Church and State.” Jefferson, and those influenced by
Enlightenment thinkers, envisioned a country that maintained “a
25
perfect separation between ecclesiastical and civil matters.”
However, critics called attention to the flaws in this black-and-white
approach, arguing that the First Amendment “does not say that in
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
26
State.” Rather, “it studiously defines the manner, specific ways, in

20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra note 128–29 and accompanying text.
23. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of
Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1997).
24. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 146, 164 (1878)).
25. See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 102 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Why Separate Church and State?, 85 OR. L. REV. 351 (2006)
(advocating for a complete separation between church and state).
26. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
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which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on
27
the other.”
In modern times, the “wall of separation” interpretation of the
Establishment Clause has essentially been replaced by a theory of
28
complete neutrality toward religion. In other words, government
cannot support religion over non-religion, nor can it favor one
29
religion over another. While still supporting the ideology of
separation between church and state, the neutrality principle does
30
not advocate for hostility towards religion.
The Supreme Court has largely modeled its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence on this principle since the mid-twentieth
31
century. However, the Court has, at times, seemingly abandoned
neutrality for a narrower reading of the Establishment Clause: the
32
so-called “accommodation” approach. Unlike the Jeffersonian
view—which seeks to preclude most, if not all, government
involvement with religion—the accommodation approach
advocates for a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause
33
in which government can more easily interact with religion. A
narrow interpretation, the accommodationists argue, is more in
34
line with the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Whatever
the original intent of the Framers or the individual philosophies of
the Justices of the Supreme Court, it is clear that current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is dictated by one case and the
35
“ground rules” it established: Lemon v. Kurtzman.
2.

The Lemon Test

In Lemon, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of a Rhode
Island statute that sought to supplement the salaries of teachers
27. Id.
28. Sedler, supra note 23, at 1339.
29. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985).
30. Sedler, supra note 23, at 1339.
31. Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v.
ACLU, 71 MO. L. REV. 317, 351 (2006) (“Last term, neutrality was the favored
Establishment Clause principle. And, it has enjoyed that status for more than fifty
years.”).
32. Id. at 352–53. See infra note 41 for an example of this approach in Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
33. Sedler, supra note 23, at 1318 n.2.
34. Harwood, supra note 31, at 352–53.
35. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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who taught secular subjects in parochial schools. In order to
ensure that these teachers were teaching only secular subjects, the
state required submission of the schools’ financial data and other
37
records. The Supreme Court deemed the statute unconstitutional,
ruling that the statute would require continuous state surveillance,
which would lead to excessive entanglement of government with
38
religion. In striking down the Rhode Island statute, the Court
announced a new rule: A statute conforms to the Establishment
Clause if (1) it serves a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal
or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it
does not foster an excessive government entanglement with
39
religion. Despite the widespread displeasure with the Lemon test in
40
it remains a benchmark for
the academic community,
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, all but one post-Lemon
Supreme Court case involving the Establishment Clause has
41
applied this test to resolve the issue at hand.
The three prongs of the Lemon test reflect the “cumulative
42
criteria developed by the Court over many years.” The first prong
(the “purpose prong”) determines whether the actual purpose of a
statute or government action is to “endorse or disapprove of
43
religion.” Although a law need not be unrelated to religion, it

36. Id. at 607.
37. Id. at 607–08.
38. Id. at 619 (“These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between state and church.”).
39. Id. at 612–13.
40. Sedler, supra note 23, at 1344.
41. Id. at n.108. The one exception to this pattern came in Marsh v. Chambers,
where the Court interpreted the Establishment Clause through the lens of its
historical background and the “intent” of the Framers. See 463 U.S. 783, 786–92
(1983). In doing so, the majority concluded that the Framers of the Constitution
did not intend for the Establishment Clause to prohibit prayer in the legislature.
Id. at 788 (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did
not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued
without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”). Ironically, both
Marsh and Lemon were authored by Chief Justice Burger.
42. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. Some have suggested that the first two prongs
were derived from School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), and that the third prong was a result of the decision in Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See William Van Alstyne, What Is “An
Establishment of Religion”?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 909, 909 n.2 (1987).
43. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985).
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must not abandon neutrality and act with the intent of promoting a
44
particular point of view in religious matters. In order to make this
determination, courts may need to take a close look at a
government action “to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from
45
a sincere one.’” The second prong (the “effect prong”)
determines whether the practice, regardless of its purpose,
46
“conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” A law violates
this prong if it is “fair to say that the government itself has
47
advanced religion through its own activities and influence.”
The third prong of the Lemon test—the “entanglement
prong”—is the prong most relevant in Pfeil, and it requires a
48
determination of the degree of entanglement. Because a certain
level of entanglement of government with religion is inevitable,
49
and indeed permitted, it must be deemed excessive in order to
50
violate the Establishment Clause. However, certain religious
programs “whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details
of administration and planning” pose a risk of entanglement
51
through government participation. It is therefore necessary to
consider the relationship between the government and the
religious entity, as well as other factors, to determine the level of
52
entanglement.

44. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
45. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (quoting
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
46. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
47. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337. It is important to note that improper advancement
of religion by the government is not limited to direct means. The Supreme Court
has gone so far as to suggest that social pressure should be accorded the same
weight as more direct means of coercion. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
48. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (“The test is
inescapably one of degree.”).
49. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) (“Interaction between
church and state is inevitable . . . and we have always tolerated some level of
involvement between the two.”).
50. Id.
51. Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing the risk that
government involvement in certain religious programs will politicize religion).
52. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). The Court has
suggested that three factors should be considered when determining if
entanglement is excessive: (1) “the character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefitted,” (2) “the nature of the aid that the State provides,” and (3) “the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.” Id.
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Excessive Entanglement

Given that not all government entanglement with religion is
unconstitutional, it is useful to differentiate between cases deemed
excessive from those permitted, particularly in the ecclesiastical
realm.
Courts have found the government to be excessively entangled
with religion in a variety of contexts. In one case, a Connecticut
statute provided workers with an absolute right to observe their
53
Sabbath on any day of the week. The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s holding that the statute excessively entangled
government with religion by requiring the state to decide which
religious activities constituted an “observance of Sabbath” in order
54
to assess an employee’s sincerity. In another case, a Baltimore city
ordinance made it a misdemeanor to falsely indicate, with intent to
55
defraud, that food complied with kosher standards. The Fourth
Circuit held that the Baltimore ordinance, which required the
employment of three ordained Orthodox Rabbis to enforce the
kosher standards, would require the government to become
excessively entangled with religion and would therefore violate the
56
Establishment Clause.
Because entanglement must be excessive to be considered
unconstitutional, it is not surprising that many relationships
between government and religious institutions are permitted. In
Bowen v. Kendrick, for example, the constitutionality of the
57
Adolescent Family Life Act was challenged. This Act provided
federal grants to public and private organizations “for services and
research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and
58
pregnancy.” Some of the grantees were religiously affiliated,
which required the government to review the grantee’s educational

53. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 706 (1985).
54. Id. at 708.
55. Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat & Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337, 1338
(4th Cir. 1995).
56. Id. at 1342 (stating that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face
because it “vest[ed] significant investigative, interpretive, and enforcement power
in a group of individuals based on their membership in a specific religious sect”).
The court further found that the city ordinance violated the “effect prong” of the
Lemon test because it impermissibly advanced and endorsed the Jewish faith. Id. at
1346.
57. 487 U.S. 589, 589 (1988).
58. Id.
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materials and monitor them with periodic visits to avoid First
59
Amendment concerns. Although the Court acknowledged that
some entanglement was necessary, it did not find the entanglement
60
excessive and held the Act constitutional on its face. Likewise, the
61
Supreme Court in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland ruled
that annual audits of religiously-affiliated colleges and universities
62
did not amount to excessive entanglement. In Minnesota, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v.
Hill-Murray High School held that lay faculty members at religious
schools could collectively bargain without violating the
63
Establishment Clause. The court reasoned that the subjects of
negotiation (hours, wages, working conditions) were entirely
secular terms of employment and therefore did not implicate First
64
Amendment concerns.
Still, other courts have attempted to avoid a constitutional
question altogether, electing instead to bypass the excessive
entanglement question and defer to the decision of the religious
65
organization. For example, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,
the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend that the
59. See id. at 615–17.
60. See id. at 617.
61. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
62. Id. at 767. These audits were performed in order to ensure that the aid
provided was being used for secular purposes. Id. at 742. In ruling that the
entanglement was not excessive, the Court stressed that the audits performed
would not likely be any more entangling than audits involved in the course of the
normal accreditation process. Id. at 764. Additionally, the Court reasoned that the
danger of political divisiveness would be substantially lessened because the aided
institutions were not elementary or secondary schools. Id. at 765–66.
63. 487 N.W.2d 857, 864 (Minn. 1992). In holding that the Minnesota Labor
Relations Act (MLRA) was intended to allow lay faculty members to collectively
bargain, the court declined to “categorize th[e] minimal responsibility [of the
duty to bargain about employment conditions] as excessive entanglement.” Id.
“The first amendment wall of separation between church and state” did not
prohibit limited government regulation of secular aspects at the school. Id. And
although Hill-Murray’s holding was seemingly contradictory to NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the court also highlighted the difference
between the Congressional intent in creating the NLRA and the history and intent
of the MLRA. Id. at 861–62.
64. Hill Murray, 487 N.W.2d at 863. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court
took care not to extend its holding past the faculty members’ ability to negotiate
on conditions of employment. The court clarified that “doctrinal and religious
issues are matters of inherent managerial policy and are nonnegotiable.” Id. at 87.
65. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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National Labor Relations Act would require parochial schools to
66
recognize the unionization of lay faculty members. Accordingly,
the Court declined to construe the Act in a manner that would
67
require a deeper inquiry into First Amendment issues.
As these cases suggest, the mere fact that a court decides a case
involving the government regulation of, or relationship with, a
religious institution does not necessarily amount to excessive
68
entanglement. Judicial scrutiny of the relationship between
church and state only becomes problematic when courts are
required to overrule a religiously based act or interpret religious
69
doctrine. However, if a court can apply laws of general
applicability (i.e., neutral principles of law), it can regulate the
activities of a religious organization without implicating the
70
excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test.
B.

Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine
1.

Origins: First Amendment

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which limits a secular
71
court’s ability to decide matters associated with church doctrine,
finds its roots in the First Amendment of the United States
72
Constitution. Although it is unclear from which exact source the
doctrine is derived, it is generally understood to have developed
from judicial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause or the
73
These clauses, which provide that
Establishment Clause.

66. Id. at 506; see also St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 787–88 (1981) (holding that Congress did not intend
religiously-affiliated schools to be subject to federal unemployment compensation
laws).
67. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. at 507.
68. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: A Revisit, 59
WAYNE L. REV. 589, 653 (2013).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 655 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012)); see also infra Section IV.A.
71. Jarod S. Gonzalez, At the Intersection of Religious Organization Missions and
Employment Laws: The Case of Minister Employment Suits, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 303, 309
(2015) (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25
(1976)); see Shea Sisk Wellford, Tort Actions Against Churches–What Protections Does
the First Amendment Provide?, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 193, 197 (1994).
72. Gonzalez, supra note 71, at 309.
73. See Christopher R. Farrel, Note: Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
74
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” seek to
simultaneously lift government-imposed burdens on the exercise of
75
religion and prohibit preferential treatment of a religion.
2.

Evolution of the Doctrine in Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Most of the early cases that invoked the ecclesiastical
76
abstention doctrine dealt with church property disputes. The
77
framework for the doctrine was set in 1871 in Watson v. Jones. In
Watson, two rival factions of a Kentucky Presbyterian Church were
78
divided: the minority in favor of slavery and the majority opposed.
The church had recently purchased a parcel of land and conveyed
the title to the trustees of the church, with the restriction that both
the property and trustees follow the “fundamental laws” of the
79
national Presbyterian Church. The General Assembly, the highest
judicatory in the Presbyterian Church, instructed pro-slavery
members of the church to “repent and forsake [their] sins before
80
they could be received.” The pro-slavery faction, being staunchly
opposed to this resolution, assumed control of the property and
claimed that the requirement was contrary to the Church’s
81
constitution. The General Assembly rejected this notion and
declared the anti-slavery faction to be the rightful owners of the
82
property. When faced with the decision of which faction was the

Catholic Church, 19 J.L. & POL. 109, 116 (2003).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible
Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1990). See
generally 1 W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
LAW § 1.2, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2017).
76. See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 511–14
(2005). For an in-depth historical analysis of civil court adjudication of church
property disputes, see Justin M. Gardner, Ecclesiastical Divorce in Hierarchical
Denominations and the Resulting Custody Battle Over Church Property: How the Supreme
Court Has Needlessly Rendered Church Property Trusts Ineffectual, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV.
235, 240–45 (2007).
77. 80 U.S. 679 (1871); see also Farrel, supra note 73, at 116–17.
78. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 690–91.
79. See id. at 683.
80. Id. at 691.
81. Id. at 692.
82. Id.
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lawful owner of the property, the Supreme Court elected to defer
to the ruling of the Presbyterian General Assembly because of the
83
ecclesiastic nature of the issue. The Court outlined three principal
reasons for its decision to defer.
First, a church’s ability to make governance decisions is at the
very heart of religious freedom and therefore should not be
84
decided by civil courts. In other words, a court should be reluctant
85
to interfere with internal affairs of private religious associations.
Interference in this area, according to the Court, “would lead to
86
the total subversion of such religious bodies.”
Second, the Court justified its deference by analogizing to a
87
contractual agreement. The Court acknowledged that there is an
unquestioned right to organize voluntary religious associations, but
all who associate themselves with such an organization implicitly
88
consent to the laws and decisions of its governing body. The
question then became whether the church polity was
89
congregational or hierarchical, which would determine the type
90
of deference shown. If the church was congregational, a
83. Id. at 732 (quoting German Reformed Church v. Com. ex rel. Seibert, 3
Pa. 282, 291 (1896)) (“The decisions of ecclesiastical courts, like every other
judicial tribunal, are final; as they are the best judges of what constitutes an
offence against the word of God and the discipline of the church.”).
84. Id. at 729 (“It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their
right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves,
that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance,
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.”). The Court
conceded that this philosophy contrasted with English doctrine at the time, which
stated that it was the duty of the court to determine the standard of faith in the
church. Id. at 727.
85. See Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy
and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1293 (1980).
86. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
87. See id. (“All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied
consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.”).
88. Id. at 728–29. If civil courts could overturn religious tribunals on matters
of church doctrine, the Court argued, the purpose and influence of the religious
tribunals would be meaningless. Id. at 729 (“But it would be a vain consent and
would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them
reversed.”).
89. Id. at 722–23.
90. Congregational churches are more autonomous than hierarchical
institutions. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1292 n.6. Because they do not
generally recognize a superior authority, these types of churches govern
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resolution would be determined according to the rules governing
91
ordinary voluntary associations. If, however, the church was
92
hierarchical in nature, the Court would defer to the highest
93
church tribunal that had considered the conflict. Because the
church at issue was hierarchical, the Court elected to defer to the
ruling of the highest church tribunal: the Presbyterian General
94
Assembly.
Finally, the Court recognized that civil courts do not
necessarily possess the expertise or competence needed to
95
interpret church doctrine. Given that many churches have “a body
96
of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of [their] own,” review by a
civil court would “be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in
97
the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.”
Therefore, the Presbyterian General Assembly would be in the best
98
position to define the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church.

themselves and are “free to affiliate and withdraw from other church organizations
at will.” Id. Examples include numerous Baptist churches, Jewish congregations,
and Quakers. Id.
91. Watson, 80 U.S. at 725; see also Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1292–
93. For example, in the case of a land dispute with no clear title, a decision
reached by the majority of the congregation would be conclusive. Adams &
Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1293; cf. Sedler, supra note 68, at 646 (“[W]hen the form
of church organization is congregational rather than hierarchical, the courts may
. . . apply general principles of contract and property law to determine which of
the contending factions is entitled to the church property.”).
92. A hierarchical organization is defined as an organization of
churches “having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or
ecclesiastical head.” Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1292 n.6 (quoting Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 110
(1952)). Examples include the Roman Catholic Church, Eastern Orthodox
Church, and Presbyterian Church. Id.
93. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727; see also Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1293.
Scholars have noted the risk of granting this much power to a church tribunal. If
the deference doctrine was strictly applied in these cases, a hierarchical church
judicatory would have “almost unlimited authority over its associated churches.”
Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1301–02.
94. Watson, 80 U.S. at 733–735.
95. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1293; David J. Overstreet, Does the
Bible Preempt Contract Law?: A Critical Examination of Judicial Reluctance to Adjudicate a
Cleric’s Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against a Religious Organization, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 263, 273 (1996).
96. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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In a similar case decided just one year after Watson, the Court
once again heard a property dispute between two competing
99
factions of a church. Like Watson, both divisions claimed to be the
100
“true” church. Although the Court conceded that it could not
resolve matters of church discipline, it still asserted authority to
101
decide the property dispute at issue. In order to resolve the
dispute, the Court was willing to inquire into the organizational
102
structure of the church.
A pair of cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth103
104
centuries modified the scope of Watson. In Brundage v. Deardorf,
the court stated that the deference shown in Watson did not extend
to decisions made by a hierarchical church judicatory that were “in
fraud of the rights of a minority seeking to maintain the integrity of
105
the original compact.” A court is not obligated to defer to
religious authority in the case of an “open, flagrant, avowed
106
violation” of the church’s fundamental law. And the Supreme
107
Court in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, although
acknowledging the high level of deference shown to the decisions
of church tribunals, indicated that an exception might be made in
108
the case of “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness . . . .” Although
these cases were rooted in the contractual rationale of Watson and

99. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 133–34 (1872).
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 139.
102. Id. at 140. Ultimately, the Court found that the church was
congregational. Id. Since a congregational church is represented only by the
majority of its members, the actions of the small minority to excommunicate
church members and trustees was held to be invalid. Id.
103. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1302–03.
104. 55 F. 839 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893), aff’d, 92 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1899).
Although Brundage was not a Supreme Court case, it is notable that the author of
the opinion, Judge Taft, would later serve as Chief Justice during the term in
which Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, infra note 108, was decided.
See Frank Freidel and Hugh Sidey, William Howard Taft Biography, in THE
PRESIDENTS
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
OF
AMERICA
(2006),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/presidents/williamhowardtaft.
105. Brundage, 55 F. at 847–48.
106. Id. at 846. Since a violation of the original compact amounted to “a
withdrawal from the lawful organization of the church,” the violating party was not
entitled to the property in dispute. Id.
107. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
108. Id. at 16.
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109

did not implicate the First Amendment, subsequent cases were
110
firmly grounded in the United States Constitution.
The deference rule in Watson was first recognized as a
constitutional principle in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
111
112
Russian Orthodox Church. In Kedroff, a section of a New York
statute proposed the transfer of administrative power in the
Russian Orthodox churches of New York from the central
governing authority in Moscow to the Russian Orthodox Church in
113
America.
Because the Russian Orthodox Church was
hierarchical, the Court deferred to the highest governing body in
114
Moscow. Thus, the section of the statute that attempted to
transfer power was ruled unconstitutional because it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and proscribed the free exercise of
115
religion.
The doctrine was affirmed once again in 1976 when the
Supreme Court refused to overrule an Eastern Orthodox Church’s
decision to defrock one of its bishops because adjudication would
109. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Autonomy
Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 449 (2011)
(explaining that since Watson was decided before the First Amendment was
incorporated against the states, federal common law was used to justify the
holding).
110. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976) (“For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive
inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decision of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity . . . .”); Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)
(discussing how the federal Constitution gives religious organizations the “power
to decide for themselves, free from state [or court] interference”).
111. See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 85, at 1303. The Kedroff Court found the
rule to be implicit in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Kedroff,
344 U.S. at 116 (“Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of
choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional
protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.”).
112. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
113. Id. at 97–99.
114. Id. at 120.
115. Id. at 107. Kedroff’s holding, applying to legislative action, was extended
to include judicial action eight years later. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (stating that abuse of state power is prohibited, whether
by the legislature or judiciary, and reversing a state court’s judgment that
reassigned control of Saint Nicholas Cathedral from the Russian Orthodox
Church in Moscow to the Russian Church of America).
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require “extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and
116
polity,” thereby violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In doing so, the Supreme Court again recognized that the
Constitution requires civil courts to give great deference to
117
religious tribunals when addressing doctrinal issues.
In recent years, courts have extended the doctrine to exempt
churches from following employment discrimination laws when
making decisions regarding ministerial employees—a so-called
118
“ministerial exception.” In other words, if a civil court were to
enforce employment discrimination laws on churches, it would
essentially be appointing and dismissing ministers, which would
violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
119
Clause. However, not all employment claims in the religious
context have been denied. The Court has applied the Fair Labor
Standards Act to a commercial business operated by a religious
120
foundation and has applied a California sales and use tax to a
121
religious organization’s sale of religious materials.
Although great deference has been given to church authority
since Watson, it is clear that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
and its progeny do not grant infinite autonomy to a religious
122
123
organization. If a court can apply “neutral principles of law” to

116. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
117. See Farrel, supra note 73, at 119–20.
118. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 705–06 (2012). For an extended analysis of the ministerial exception and its
relevance in Hosanna-Tabor, see Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on HosannaTabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012); see also infra note 221 and
accompanying text.
119. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. The Court has also clarified that
Congress intended for church-affiliated schools to be exempt from federal
unemployment compensation laws. St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Church v.
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 784 (1981).
120. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306
(1985). The Court held, in part, that the federal statute did not pose an
entanglement issue. Id. at 305. The recordkeeping required by the statute was no
more intrusive than other permitted government activities, such as fire inspections
and building and zoning regulations. Id. at 305–06.
121. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378,
397 (1990). The Court found no “constitutionally significant” entanglement in the
administrative burdens that the law placed on the plaintiff. Id. at 394.
122. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979); Presbyterian Church in
the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969); see also supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text.
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resolve controversies involving religious organizations, adjudication
of the merits does not involve “an internal church decision that
124
affects the faith and mission of the church itself” and therefore
125
does not violate the First Amendment. It is only when a claim
126
implicates church doctrine that deference is required.
3.

The Doctrine in Minnesota

Given that the First Amendment is applicable to the States by
127
way of incorporation, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is
applicable in Minnesota. Although the United States Supreme
Court has never endorsed a specific test when applying the
doctrine, Minnesota courts have analyzed the ecclesiastical
128
abstention doctrine under the Establishment Clause. Specifically,
Minnesota courts have used the three-pronged test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman to determine whether a state action violates the
129
Establishment Clause.
While the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is applicable in
Minnesota, the state’s courts have frequently used neutral
130
principles of law to avoid any First Amendment quandaries. This

123. See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d
426, 435 (Minn. 2002); Neutral Principles, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining neutral principles as “[r]ules grounded in law, as opposed to rules based
on personal interests or beliefs”).
124. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
125. See infra Section IV.A.
126. See infra Section IV.A.
127. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“The process of absorption of the religious guarantees
of the First Amendment as protections against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment began with the Free Exercise Clause.”).
128. See, e.g., Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 435.
129. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)) (“[A] state
action must have a secular purpose, must neither inhibit nor advance religion in
its primary effect, and must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.”); see supra Section II.A.2.
130. See, e.g., Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487
N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn. 1992) (holding that the Minnesota Labor Relations Act,
which granted collective-bargaining privileges to parochial school employees, was
a neutral law that did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Piletich v. Deretich,
328 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1982) (holding that a court is constitutionally
entitled to use neutral principles of law to determine church property ownership);
Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that the district court could constitutionally examine religious
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is what occurred in Geraci v. Eckankar, where a female systems
analyst sued her religiously-affiliated employer for gender
131
discrimination and defamation, among other claims.
While
132
declining to decide the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals saw no problem in considering the
133
defamation claim. Even though the alleged incident was in a
religious context, the court still applied the defamation analysis
and ultimately held that the employer did not defame the
134
plaintiff.
A similar use of neutral principles of law appeared in State v.
135
Wenthe, where the Minnesota Supreme Court was tasked with
determining the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited clergyparishioner sexual conduct occurring during the course of spiritual
136
counseling. The Defendant argued that the “statute excessively
entangle[d] the State with religion because it require[d] an inquiry
into whether an individual [was] seeking religious or spiritual
137
advice, aid, or comfort.” The court rejected this argument, noting
that precedent permitted a court to determine whether advice
138
given by a clergy member was “of a religious or spiritual nature.”
Because a court can make this determination by using neutral
principles of law, the court reasoned, it does not become

documents in order to apply neutral principles of law).
131. 526 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
132. Id. at 401. The court reasoned that the gender discrimination claim
would require the court to question the employment decisions of the church. Id.
(“[W]e cannot devise a way to determine if this reason for termination was a
pretext for discrimination without questioning the reasons for the
excommunication and the veracity of those reasons.”).
133. Id. at 397–98.
134. Id. at 397. The court held that the plaintiff was not defamed because the
statements did not refer to her specifically and could not be proven false. Id.
135. 839 N.W.2d 83 (Minn. 2013).
136. Id. at 86–87.
137. Id. at 91.
138. Id. (Hanson, J., plurality opinion) (quoting State v. Bussmann, 741
N.W.2d 79, 89 n.5 (Minn. 2007)). The court also recognized that similar inquiries
were permitted in the context of clergy-penitent privilege. Id. (citing State v.
Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 85–86 (Minn. 2001); State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 216
(Minn. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 909 n.4
(Minn. 1996)).
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139

excessively entangled with religion. Accordingly, the statute was
140
held to be constitutional.
141
In Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
the Minnesota Supreme Court established the analytical framework
142
for adjudicating tort claims against religious organizations. The
plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist church, brought a
variety of claims against his former minister—most notably one for
143
negligent counseling. In holding that the district court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate the negligence claim, the court reasoned
that the statutory definition of “mental health practitioner” could
be interpreted without implicating religious doctrine, and
therefore the court did not excessively entangle itself with the
144
church.
As these cases demonstrate, neutral principles of law have
been embraced and utilized by Minnesota courts for years.
Although adjudication of matters involving church doctrine and
polity is still forbidden, Minnesota courts have used neutral
principles of law as an alternative method to adjudicate certain
lawsuits while preventing excessive entanglement with religion.
III. THE PFEIL DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

LaVonne and Henry Pfeil (“Pfeils”) were devoted members of
St. Matthew Evangelical Lutheran Church in Worthington,
145
a church associated with the Lutheran ChurchMinnesota,
146
Missouri Synod.

139. Id. at 91–92.
140. Id. at 92.
141. 649 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 2002).
142. See Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 542 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J.,
dissenting); infra Section IV.A.
143. Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 429.
144. Id. at 438.
145. Although the church’s legal name is “St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran
Church of the Unaltered Augsburg Confession of Worthington, Nobles County,
Minnesota,” the church refers to itself as “St. Matthew” and is referred to as such
throughout this Note. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 530 n.1 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 530–31.
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On August 22, 2011, the Pfeils received notice that they had
147
been excommunicated from the church for misconduct. In this
letter, signed by St. Matthew’s pastors Thomas Braun (“Braun”)
and Joe Behnke (“Behnke”), the Pfeils were accused of engaging in
148
“slander and gossip” against the church. Shortly thereafter, the
leadership and congregation of St. Matthew held a special meeting
149
to affirm or reject the Pfeils’ excommunication. The meeting
attendees, after being presented with the August 22 letter that
150
outlined the allegations, voted to affirm the excommunication.
In March 2012, a Missouri Synod panel agreed to hold a
hearing to reconsider the excommunication, but the decision was
151
affirmed. It was during this hearing that Behnke allegedly stated
that the Pfeils had accused him of stealing money from the
152
church. The Pfeils subsequently brought a lawsuit against St.
Matthew, Braun, and Behnke (collectively, “respondents”),
153
asserting claims for defamation and negligence.
Relying on the First Amendment and the ecclesiastical
154
abstention doctrine, the Nobles County District Court granted
respondents’ motion to dismiss after determining it was precluded
from ruling on the Pfeils’ claims due to lack of subject-matter
155
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the
jurisdiction.
district court’s finding, reasoning that the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine barred an inquiry into the excommunication

147. Id. at 531.
148. Id. Among other allegations, the letter also claimed that “[t]he Pfeils
engaged in behavior unbecoming of a Christian” and “intentionally attacked,
questioned, and discredited the integrity” of church leaders. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Henry Pfeil died in April 2012, and Lavonne Pfeil was named trustee
for Henry’s claims. Id. at 531 n.3.
154. Id. at 532.
155. Id. at 531–32. Respondents also moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e). Id. at 532 n.4. The
district court granted the motion with respect to the claims made by the recently
deceased Henry Pfeil but denied the motion with respect to LaVonne Pfeil’s
claims. Id. It is also worth noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court majority,
relying on Hosanna-Tabor, clarified that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did
not act as a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 535. However, the majority did not go so far as
to categorize the doctrine as an affirmative defense. Id.
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156

proceedings. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court sought to
determine whether adjudicating the Pfeils’ claims would amount to
157
an “excessive governmental entanglement with religion”
or
involve “an internal church decision that affect[ed] the faith and
158
mission of the church itself.”
B.

Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Dissent

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Pfeils primarily
argued that adjudication of certain claims would not violate the
159
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. By analyzing each
claim separately, the court could circumvent the First Amendment
160
issue by using neutral principles of law on the permissible claims.
By doing so, respondents’ First Amendment rights would still be
161
sufficiently protected. Respondents countered that adjudicating
162
any of the claims would violate the First Amendment, given “the
163
religious context in which the statements were made.”
Adjudicating church statements made in disciplinary proceedings,
respondents argued, would have a chilling effect on future
164
speech.
The majority agreed with respondents and held that the
statement-by-statement approach advocated by the Pfeils would
violate the First Amendment because it would foster an excessive
165
entanglement of government with religion.
Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Pfeils’
166
claims. In doing so, the majority reasoned that differentiating
156. Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered
Augsburg Confession, No. A14-0605, 2015 WL 134055, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
12, 2015), aff’d, 877 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016).
157. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 537 (quoting Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Minn. 2002)).
158. Id. (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012)).
159. Id. at 537–38. Although the Pfeils acknowledged that most of their claims
could not serve as the basis for a defamation claim, they argued that four of the
claims could still be adjudicated in a constitutional manner. Id. at 538.
160. See id. at 537–38.
161. See id. at 539.
162. Id. at 536.
163. Id. at 538.
164. See id. at 539.
165. Id. at 542.
166. Id.
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between religious and secular statements might require the court
to interpret church doctrine, which would amount to an
167
unconstitutional entanglement of government with religion.
Furthermore, the court feared that adjudicating claims on a
statement-by-statement basis would act as an incentive for a
religious organization to—in order to avoid litigation—justify every
168
decision under the guise of church doctrine.
The dissenting opinion rejected the notion that merely
determining whether or not a claim excessively entangles the court
169
is, in and of itself, excessive entanglement. The dissent stated that
because the United States Supreme Court had never decided an
170
analogous case, the majority’s holding directly contradicted the
171
Accordingly, the dissent
precedent established in Odenthal.
argued that the court could have, and should have, used neutral
172
principles of law to determine whether defamation had occurred.
Additionally, the dissent advocated for the use of a qualified
privilege to balance the relative rights of a defamed party and a
173
religious organization.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Neutral Principles of Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court erred in holding that the
adjudication of any of the Pfeils’ claims would necessarily amount
to an excessive entanglement with religion and therefore violate
the First Amendment. The majority should have reversed and
remanded the case to the district court, and it should have
instructed the lower court to use neutral principles of law in
determining which statements could be adjudicated without
174
implicating the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
A court has two options when deciding a dispute involving a
church disciplinary proceeding: (1) it may defer to the religious
tribunal’s ruling; or (2) if the dispute does not require the court to
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
See id. at 544 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
Id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
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decipher issues of an ecclesiastical nature, it may use neutral
175
principles of law to make a decision. In deciding Pfeil, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ignored the analytical framework it had
established in Odenthal v. Minnesota Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists. As a result, Odenthal and Pfeil adopted conflicting
176
177
holdings, thereby diluting the doctrine of stare decisis.
In Odenthal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the
district court did not entangle itself with religion by determining
whether a minister met the statutory definition of an “unlicensed
178
mental health practitioner.” Even though the claim was in a
religious context, the district court was permitted to use neutral
principles of law because the statutory definition was neutral on its
179
face and did not involve religious principles. Similarly, one of the
statements in Pfeil, the allegation that Behnke accused the Pfeils of
180
saying Behnke had stolen church funds, can be resolved without
implicating church doctrine by using the neutral law of

175. Cf. Isaac A. McBeth & Jennifer R. Sykes, Comment, The Unavoidable
Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 509, 521 (2011)
(explaining how courts use these same two approaches in the related context of
church property disputes).
176. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 544 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in Odenthal
hints that adjudicating a particular kind of state tort claim is entangling per se. To
the contrary, it requires that we analyze state tort claims on a claim-by-claim
basis.”).
177. Id. The doctrine of stare decisis is crucial to the judiciary, lending both
certainty and legitimacy to the judicial process. See generally Jordan Wilder
Connors, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial
Methodology, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 681 (2008) (discussing the merits of stare decisis
and its role in legitimizing judicial review).
178. See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d
426, 438 (Minn. 2002); see also MINN. STAT. § 148B.60, subdiv. 3 (1998) (repealed
2003) (statutory definition of “unlicensed mental health practitioner”).
179. See Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 438; see also State v. Wenthe, 839 N.W.2d 83,
90 (Minn. 2014) (“No entanglement problem exists . . . when civil courts use
neutral principles of law—rules or standards that have been developed and are
applied without particular regard to religious institutions or doctrines—to resolve
disputes even though those disputes involve religious institutions or actors.”);
Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d 862, 872 (Or. App. 2010) (“If, however, the statements
. . . do not concern the religious beliefs and practices of the religious organization
. . . then the First Amendment does not necessarily prevent adjudication of the
defamation claim . . . .”).
180. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Unaltered Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528 (2016) (No.
A14-0605), 2015 WL 5000489, at *25.
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181

defamation. Even though the claim may have originated in a
religious context, the claim is secular in nature because its
determination does not involve matters of religious doctrine or
182
polity. Whether or not the claim was defamatory has nothing to
do with “an internal church decision that affects the faith and
183
mission of the church itself.”
Indeed, courts outside of Minnesota have been willing to
distinguish secular claimsspecifically, defamationfrom those
involving religion. In Miles v. Perry, a church secretary was accused
of misappropriating church funds by the pastor and board of
184
trustees. These accusations were made by the pastor and board of
185
trustees within the context of a church board meeting. The
Connecticut Appellate Court declined to dismiss the plaintiff’s
186
defamation claim, reasoning that the defamatory accusations
were actionable per se because they involved “a crime involving
187
moral turpitude” and referred to “improper conduct or lack of
188
skill or integrity in one’s profession.” In other words, the court
determined that analysis of church doctrine was not required in
order to find that the accusations were defamatory.
Similarly, in St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, a
189
pastor accused two church employees of carrying on an affair.
The accusation spread to members of the church, leading to the

181. In order to recover for a defamatory statement, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) statement was communicated to someone other than plaintiff; (2) statement
was false; (3) statement harmed plaintiff’s reputation; and (4) statement is not
protected by a qualified privilege. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d
252, 255–57 (Minn. 1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
182. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–04 (1979) (explaining that there is
no entanglement issue when neutral principles of law are applied without regard
to religious institutions or doctrines); cf. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
183. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 707 (2012).
184. 529 A.2d 199, 202 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 213.
187. Id. at 209 (citing Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 72 A.2d 820, 825
(Conn. 1950)).
188. Id. (quoting Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 116 A.2d 440,
444 (Conn. 1955)).
189. 568 A.2d 35, 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
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dismissal of the plaintiff, one of the accused employees. After
suing for defamation and invasion of privacy, the plaintiff was
awarded more than $300,000 in compensatory and punitive
191
damages even though the defamatory statements were uttered
within the church context. And in Marshall v. Munro, the plaintiff,
an ordained minister, was denied a job with a church based on
192
derogatory information the church had received. The plaintiff
was accused of being divorced, being dishonest, being “unable to
perform pastoral duties due to throat surgery,” and making
193
improper advances at a church member. Although the Alaska
Supreme Court declined to rule on the plaintiff’s breach of
194
contract claim, the claims of defamation and interference with
195
contract were considered. Noting that courts “have a duty to
adjudicate in neutral terms . . . without resolving underlying
196
religious issues,”
the court ruled that the defamation and
interference with contract claims could be severed from the
197
impermissible claims. While both the plaintiff and the defendant
were pastors, the claims of defamation and interference with
contract did not implicate the plaintiff’s “qualifications or the
198
qualifications required of pastors in general.”
In an even more liberal use of the neutral principles of law
doctrine, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to summarily dismiss a
199
plaintiff’s defamation claim in the church context. In Kliebenstein
v. Iowa Conference of United Methodist Church, a United Methodist
Church district superintendent accused the plaintiff of embodying
190. Id. at 36–37.
191. Id. at 37. Although the case was later remanded to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, it was done so in order to affirm the ruling of the Circuit Court.
Id. at 43.
192. 845 P.2d 424, 425 (Alaska 1993).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 428. The court reasoned that determining whether the defendant
“breached a covenant of good faith would require the court to interpret Marshall’s
and Munro’s employment relationship.” Id. Therefore, the court could not
adjudicate the claim because the First Amendment does not permit courts “to
imply contractual duties on religious entities.” Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 426.
197. See id. at 428. (“There is no difficulty in separating the contract claim
from the tort claims of defamation and interference with contract.”).
198. Id.
199. See Kliebenstein v. Iowa Conference of the United Methodist Church, 663
N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 977 (2003).
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200

the “spirit of Satan.” The issue before the court was whether the
phrase “spirit of Satan” had a secular meaning that could be used
201
without interpreting church doctrine.
After consulting the
dictionary, the court determined that words such as “Satan,”
“satanic,” and “devil” all carried secular and sectarian meanings
and could therefore be analyzed “without treading on—or wading
202
into—religious doctrine.” Given the secular meaning of these
203
words, the ecclesiastical abstention issue could be avoided.
Although courts differ as to the method of analysis to be used
204
in a state tort claim against religious organizations, Odenthal
made it clear that Minnesota had already approved of the
205
statement-by-statement approach advocated by many other states.
Because there is no United States Supreme Court case that deals
206
with the issue in Pfeil, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have
207
applied the framework set in Odenthal to analyze the Pfeils’ claims
on a statement-by-statement basis.

200. Id. at 405.
201. Id. at 407.
202. Id. at 407–08. Although “spirit of Satan” was not defined in the
dictionary, the court was content to combine other words that amounted to the
same meaning. Id. Because these words could also be used in a secular context, the
court did not have to “resort to theological reflection.” Id. at 407.
203. See id. at 407–08. In addition to the secular meaning of these words, the
court emphasized that any ecclesiastical protection was weakened because the
alleged defamatory statement was disseminated to church members and nonmembers alike. Id. at 407 (quoting Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of L.A., 197
P.2d 713, 717 (1948)) (“The fact that Swinton’s communication about Jane was
published outside the congregation weakens this ecclesiastical shield. First,
otherwise privileged communications may be lost upon proof of excess publication
or publication ‘beyond the group interest.’”).
204. Compare Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran of Unaltered
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 537 n.9 (Minn. 2016) (citing examples of
courts that have declined to adjudicate defamation claims arising out of a church
disciplinary proceeding), with id. at n.10 (citing examples of states that have
adopted a claim-by-claim approach to adjudicating alleged torts made in the
church context).
205. See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 649 N.W.2d
426, 441 (Minn. 2002) (“Because these standards appear to be neutral with respect
to religion, they can be applied without excessive entanglement.”).
206. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 534.
207. Odenthal, 649 N.W.2d at 440–43.
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Extending the Scope of the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine to Avoid
a “Complicated and Messy Inquiry”

It is clear that several state courts have analyzed defamation
claims arising out of a church disciplinary proceeding on a claim208
by-claim basis. Rather than follow the analysis advocated by
numerous states and its own framework in Odenthal, the Pfeil court
announced a new rule that extended the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine beyond what is required by United States Supreme Court
209
jurisprudence.
210
In order to avoid a “complicated and messy inquiry,” the
majority relied heavily on Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
211
and School v. EEOC. However, Pfeil presented facts and issues that
212
were not addressed in Hosanna-Tabor. The holding in HosannaTabor was not meant to extend beyond employment discrimination
213
Grounding the Pfeil
suits involving ministerial employees.

208. See, e.g., Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1113 (Pa. 2009)
(holding that a court should analyze each individual claim to determine whether it
was “reasonably likely” that the plaintiff could meet its burden of proof without
intruding into the “sacred precincts”); Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 750
S.E.2d 605, 608 (S.C. 2013) (holding that statements made during a church
disciplinary hearing were independent of religious doctrine and therefore could
be adjudicated using neutral principles of law); Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74,
(Va. 2006) (holding that a defamation claim based on an alleged instance of
assault did not involve matters of church governance); see also supra notes 184–203
and accompanying text.
209. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 542 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 538 (majority opinion).
211. See id. at 534–35, 540.
212. Compare id. at 536–42 (determining whether a court can use neutral
principles of law to adjudicate a defamation claim in the context of a church
disciplinary proceeding), with Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707–10 (2012) (determining whether an
employment discrimination claim in a religious context would result in
“government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith
and mission of the church itself,” thereby precluding adjudication through the
ministerial exception).
213. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229,
274 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557 (2016). Although Priests for Life was later vacated and remanded by Zubik,
there is nothing to suggest that the opinion of the Supreme Court has changed
regarding its hesitance to extend the holding in Hosanna-Tabor. Priests for Life dealt
with a challenge to contraceptive coverage in the Affordable Care Act and did not
deal directly with the ministerial exception. See 772 F.3d at 235.
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decision in a case that did not address the same issues was
misguided.
214
Likewise, the Pfeil majority’s reliance on Black v. Snyder and
215
216
Schoenhals v. Mains was unfounded. In Snyder, the court refused
to adjudicate a pastor’s defamation claim because it was made in
the context of a church employment decision and therefore
217
triggered the ministerial exception. However, the court did allow
the pastor to bring a sexual-harassment claim because the claim did
not involve scrutiny of church doctrine or interfere with church
218
employment decisions. In Mains, the court refused to hear a
defamation claim because the alleged statements involved matters
219
of church doctrine and discipline. However, the court suggested
that one of the claims—being engaged in the “direct fabrication of
lies with the intent to hurt the reputation” of the church—
appeared neutral on its face and could possibly be adjudicated
220
without interpreting church doctrine. Accordingly, it is clear that
the Pfeil court could have adjudicated claims presented before it
while still being consistent with the holdings in Snyder and Mains.
Defamation law, which is neutral on its face, could have been
applied to the claim relating to stealing church funds because the
claim did not implicate the ministerial exception and did not
221
involve matters of church doctrine and discipline.
C.

Judicial Policy Making

As Justice Lillehaug appropriately noted in his Pfeil dissent, the
process of deciding whether government is excessively entangled
with religion does not necessarily amount to excessive
222
entanglement.
Indeed, courts are often required to make
214. 471 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug.
29, 1991).
215. 504 N.W.2d 233, 234–36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
216. See Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 535–36 (discussing the lower courts’ approvals of
Black v. Snyder and Schoenhals v. Mains).
217. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 720.
218. See id. at 721; see also Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that
adjudication of an employment contract claim is permissible if the plaintiff can
prove that the contract was breached without examining church doctrine).
219. See Schoenhals, 504 N.W.2d at 234–36.
220. Id. at 236.
221. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 546 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 544.
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223

inquiries that involve religious doctrine; this in itself does not
224
violate the First Amendment. An example of this preliminary
examination appears in cases involving the Religious Freedom
225
Restoration Act (RFRA).
In one such case, United States v.
226
Meyers, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and
227
distribute marijuana. The defendant claimed to be the founder
and Reverend of the “Church of Marijuana,” a religion that
commanded him to “use, possess, grow and distribute marijuana
228
for the good of mankind and the planet earth.” In order to
decide whether this practice was protected by RFRA, the court had
to determine whether the teachings of the “Church of Marijuana”
229
fell under RFRA’s definition of “religious beliefs.” Ultimately, the
court determined that the defendant’s beliefs amounted to a
230
personal philosophy and were therefore not protected by RFRA.
As some commentators have noted, determining what
practices are “religious” is essential to both Free Exercise and
231
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In order to do so, there
must be a certain level of flexibility for the judiciary to determine
223. Gardner, supra note 76, at 258 (“Courts are routinely required to
examine religious doctrines in order to determine whether a certain practice is
‘religious’ for the purposes of the First Amendment and various other laws that
deal with religion.”); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)
(discussing the need to examine the doctrine and practice of the Amish religion
before determining whether respondents’ beliefs were “religious” and “sincere”).
224. See Overstreet, supra note 95, at 291 n.129 (citing cases that have
distinguished between permissible judicial intrusion and excessive judicial
involvement).
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1994).
226. 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996).
227. Id. at 1479.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 1481–84.
230. See id. at 1484 (“[W]e hold that Meyers’ beliefs more accurately espouse a
philosophy and/or way of life rather than a ‘religion.’ The district court did not
err in prohibiting Meyers’ religious freedom defense.”); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”).
231. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1959–60
(2001) (arguing that prohibiting courts from making initial inquiries related to
religious beliefs would result in “killing the free exercise with kindness” and “a
weakened Establishment Clause”).
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whether a law will inhibit religious freedom or whether it will
232
excessively entangle government with religion. If, after making
this inquiry, there is no entanglement, then there is no
233
“compulsory deference to religious authority.”
Because the Pfeil court did not have to completely defer to the
religious authority of the respondents, its holding appears to be the
234
result of an intentional policy choice. By granting a religious
actor an almost unlimited opportunity to defame during
disciplinary proceedings, the court essentially balanced a defamed
victim’s right to recovery with a church’s right to discipline its
members and ruled that the scales of justice tipped toward the
235
interests of the church. The majority did not consider how its
decision might apply to scenarios involving a defamed victim’s right
to remedy; but at the same time, the majority seemed very
concerned as to the “chilling effect” that a statement-by-statement
236
analysis may have on a religious actor’s speech. And although a
church’s right to discipline is important to its freedom of religion,
adjudicating a valid defamation claim does not interfere with that
freedom. There is no need for the First Amendment to “str[ike]
237
the balance” in this case.
D.

Future Ramifications

By refusing to consider otherwise valid claims because of the
238
religious context in which they arose, the Pfeil decision effectively
allows a person to freely defame another in certain contexts. The
gravity of this decision leads one to question if more extreme
defamatory statements or other tortious acts might be permissible
232. See id.
233. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979).
234. Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 545 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J.,
dissenting).
235. See id. at 541 (majority opinion).
236. Compare id. at 539 (arguing that the separation of “religious” claims and
“secular” claims could lead to a restraint of speech), with id. at 540 n.12
(“Although we recognize the dissent’s concerns regarding future cases, it would be
inappropriate to speculate on how the First Amendment may apply to hypothetical
facts that are not before us.”).
237. Id. at 542 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)) (“[T]he First Amendment has struck the
balance for us.”).
238. Id.
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239

in a church disciplinary setting.
It is unclear, for example,
whether a plaintiff could seek a remedy after being accused of
240
sexual assault in a church disciplinary proceeding. Furthermore,
the evident conflict between Odenthal and Pfeil—both Minnesota
Supreme Court decisions—may lead future courts to make
241
inconsistent decisions. Likewise, the Pfeil court’s willingness to
extend the historically limited benefit of absolute privilege is
concerning.
1.

Expanding the Narrow Applications of Absolute Privilege in
Minnesota

Permitting a religious actor to defame another in a religious
context, as the Pfeil decision does, essentially amounts to an
242
absolute privilege. But as Minnesota courts have emphasized,
243
absolute privilege has “narrow limits” and is granted only “when
244
public policy weighs strongly in favor of such extension.” In other
words, only in cases “in which the public service or the
administration of justice requires complete immunity” will this

239. See id. at 546 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to discern why
the court’s categorical rule of law insulating religious actors from defamation
claims would not extend to and insulate those actors from liability for other
torts.”).
240. See id. at 544.
241. Cases involving similar facts and law sometimes lead to seemingly
contradictory results, which can lead to confusion in the legal community. Even
the highest court in the land is not immune from handing down inconsistent
decisions, as evidenced in some of its First Amendment jurisprudence. Compare
McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 873–74 (2005) (holding that the
presence of framed copies of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky
courthouses had a predominantly religious purpose, and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments monument displayed on
the grounds of the Texas State Capitol did not amount to an unconstitutional
government endorsement of religion).
242. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 542 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). Privileges in the
defamation context are “divided into two categories: absolute and qualified.” Erica
Holzer, Torts: Striking A Balance: Minnesota’s Minority Stance on the Privilege to Defame–
Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 559, 561
(2011) (citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416
(1954)).
243. See Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417.
244. Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2010).
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245

privilege be extended. Church disciplinary proceedings do not
constitute, and have never constituted, an area that requires
complete immunity. Accordingly, the Pfeil majority departed from
precedent by extending absolute privilege to protect church
officials in the disciplinary context. Examining current applications
of absolute privilege demonstrates this misstep.
One notable application of absolute privilege, where public
246
policy strongly favors such an extension, is to federal legislative,
247
248
judicial, and executive officials. In these contexts, the privilege
works to enable federal officials to speak freely while performing
249
their governmental duties. The rationale for such a protection is
250
not, as one might assume, to shield certain exalted individuals
but rather to promote the public welfare by giving officials the
251
freedom to run a functioning government.
To varying degrees, states have also extended absolute
252
privilege to government officials. When given the chance,
Minnesota courts have erred on the side of limiting absolute
245. See Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417.
246. Freedom of speech within the legislature has always been a pillar of
United States democracy, as evidenced by its inclusion in the Constitution:
[Members of Congress] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance
at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Every state has acknowledged this legislative privilege
in one way or another, see Holzer, supra note 242, at 566, including Minnesota. See
MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (“For any speech or debate in either house [members
of each house] shall not be questioned in any other place.”). However, even
legislative officials have a limit to the privilege they are afforded. See Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979) (holding that defamatory statements
disseminated in newsletters and press releases were not “essential to the
deliberations of the Senate” and therefore were not protected speech).
247. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871).
248. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
249. See Holzer, supra note 242, at 565.
250. See id. at 566–67.
251. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1959) (“The privilege is not a
badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to
aid in the effective functioning of government.”).
252. See Holzer, supra note 242, at 572 (“Within Minnesota, courts have
repeatedly faced the decision of whether to join this growing trend [of extending
instances of absolute privilege], or maintain the ‘narrow limits’ Minnesota has
placed on absolute privilege since it became a state.”).
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privilege and confining it within the “narrow limits” that have
253
historically been granted. Even as other jurisdictions have, at
254
times, been more generous in extending absolute privilege,
Minnesota has generally extended this privilege to legislative,
judicial, and executive officials, but only when a strong public
255
policy is served by granting absolute privilege.
In Minnesota, legislators are granted absolute privilege via the
256
The relevant section provides that
Minnesota Constitution.
members of the Minnesota legislature “shall be privileged from
arrest during the session of their respective houses” and “shall not
257
be questioned” while acting in an official capacity. Given the
inclusion of these provisions in the state’s Constitution, it is clear
that the drafters recognized the need for legislators to speak freely
in order to best serve the public. In other words, the strong public
policy that is served by extending the privilege to legislators is that
it is necessary to prevent legislators from becoming mired in
litigation, which would inevitably distract them from their duty to
258
the public. Furthermore, the timidity that would result from an
unprivileged environment would prevent legislators from being
completely forthcoming, thereby harming the public by limiting
259
access to the truth. For these reasons, it is clear that this area falls
within the “narrow limits” of absolute privilege.
Absolute privilege extends to judicial branch officials in
260
Minnesota. In Matthis v. Kennedy, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that defamatory statements made in the course of a judicial
261
proceeding are absolutely privileged if they are related to the
262
subject matter of the proceeding. The court reasoned that this
extensive protection satisfied the strong public policy of allowing
parties and their attorneys to be free to defend their causes in court

253. See id. at 573.
254. See id. at 571 nn.92–94.
255. Id. at 573.
256. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
257. Id.
258. See Holzer, supra note 242, at 567.
259. See id.
260. 243 Minn. 219, 67 N.W.2d 413 (1954).
261. See id. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417. A judicial proceeding, according to the
Matthis court, includes not only trials, but also any “proceeding of a judicial
nature.” Id.
262. See id. at 219, 67 N.W.2d at 414.
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without fear of being subjected to future lawsuits for libel and
263
slander. Thus, absolute privilege is necessary in this context.
The Minnesota Supreme Court also extended absolute
privilege to high-level state executive officials, something that was
done on the federal level almost a century earlier by the United
264
States Supreme Court and recommended by the Restatement
265
266
(Second) of Torts. In Johnson v. Dirkswager, a hospital supervisor
sued Minnesota’s Commissioner of Public Welfare for defamation,
267
among other claims.
The lawsuit concerned a telephone
interview between the Commissioner and a newspaper reporter in
which the Commissioner revealed that the hospital supervisor had
been terminated from his position because of “sexual
268
improprieties.” In ruling in favor of the Commissioner, the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the absolute privilege
enjoyed by legislative and judicial representatives should also be
269
Therefore, the
extended to top-level executive officials.
statements communicated by the Commissioner to the newspaper
reporter were protected because they were made in the course of
270
his official duty. According to the court, the public is better
served when executive officials are free to speak out in the
271
performance of their duties.
But Minnesota courts have
consistently limited this privilege to high-ranking executive
272
officials.
However, one notable exception that does extend absolute
privilege to low-level executive officials was formulated in Carradine
273
v. State. In Carradine, a motorist sued a Minnesota state trooper
263. See id. The court also noted that the privilege extended not only to
attorneys but to parties and witnesses as well. Id. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 417.
264. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896).
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
266. 315 N.W.2d 215 (Minn. 1982).
267. See id. at 217.
268. See id. This information was published the next day in the Minneapolis
Tribune. Id.
269. See id. at 221 (“It seems to us that the same policy considerations that
warrant an absolute privilege for those in the legislative and judicial branches of
government apply to the executive branch.”).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 242, at 573 n.105 (describing examples of the
Minnesota Supreme Court declining to extend absolute privilege to lower level
government employees).
273. 511 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1994).

2017]

PFEIL V. ST. MATTHEWS LUTHERAN CHURCH

339
274

for making allegedly defamatory statements in his arrest report.
While noting that police officers were not necessarily “high level”
executive officials, the court’s opinion did not turn on whether or
275
not absolute privilege should be given to “low level” employees.
Instead, the court’s inquiry was whether making an arrest report
276
was a key part of a state trooper’s duties. Because the court
determined that this was indeed an important part of an officer’s
duties, an officer would be protected from any defamation claim
277
that may arise out of a written arrest report. Accordingly, the
public policy of allowing a government official to perform
confidently—which, ultimately, benefits the public—remained
278
intact.
The holding in Carradine acted as an exception to the court’s
preference of limiting absolute privilege, but the case should not
be read as exhibiting willingness to extend this privilege to other
areas. Indeed, the Carradine court, while extending absolute
privilege to statements made in arrest reports, also held that a
qualified privilege was sufficient for police statements to the
279
media. The Carradine decision was not meant to create a broad
application of absolute privilege. Thus, the court maintained its
narrow application of the privilege.
As the above cases reveal, Minnesota courts’ extension of
absolute privilege has been very narrow. At no point have these
courts gone so far as to extend this far-reaching privilege to church
disciplinary proceedings, and for good reason: communications
within the church do not implicate the public to the same extent as
government proceedings. The rationale for the privilege in the

274. See id. at 734. In the arrest report, the police officer described the
motorist’s conduct as involving “speeding, reckless driving, fleeing an officer, and
impersonating an officer.” Id.
275. See id. at 735.
276. See id. at 736 (“Whether an executive officer is absolutely immune from
defamation liability depends on many factors, including the nature of the function
assigned to the officer and the relationship of the statements to the performance
of that function.”).
277. See id. at 736–37. Without this freedom to write a detailed and accurate
report, the court reasoned, police officers would become more hesitant and less
forthcoming, which could affect the usefulness of the report in subsequent
prosecution. Id. at 736.
278. See id. at 735.
279. See id. at 737 (“[W]e conclude that not all statements made to the press
by an arresting officer such as Trooper Chase are absolutely privileged.”).
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government setting is to promote the public welfare by
encouraging open communication, even if it is, at times,
defamatory. There is no such justification in the church
disciplinary context. Open communication between church leaders
and church members is, of course, a desirable goal, but protecting
defamatory statements made in this setting is not supported by any
strong public policy. Given the absence of justification in the
church setting and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s tradition of
hesitancy in this area, the Pfeil court should not have been so quick
to extend what essentially amounts to an absolute privilege to
defame.
2.

Balancing Interests of Church and Defamed Victim Through a
Qualified Privilege

By essentially granting a church actor carte blanche to defame
within the church, the Pfeil majority did not adequately account for
the devastating impact that a defamatory statement may have on its
280
victim. Statements made in private conversations, particularly
281
contentious ones, cannot be expected to stay private.
A better alternative would be to create a qualified privilege for
282
communications during church disciplinary proceedings. Such a
283
privilege is recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
used in other jurisdictions to balance the rights of a defamed victim
284
and the rights of a religious organization. When applied to Pfeil, a
qualified privilege would have protected all of the communications
that were religious in nature while still allowing the court to
determine if the privilege was abused in making the non-religious
280. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010) (“[D]efamatory
speech . . . can be personally crushing and career-ending.”); Holzer, supra note
242, at 564 (“Victims of defamatory speech, for example, are subject to hatred,
ridicule, obloquy, and contempt.”).
281. See Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 545 (Minn. 2016) (Lillehaug, J.,
dissenting) (“This proviso ignores the reality of how defamation can devastate its
victims. Any statement made in a closed meeting of ‘members’ and ‘participants’ is
unlikely to stay there.”).
282. Id.
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(“[Qualified privilege is available] for communications among [members of a
religious organization] concerning the qualifications of the officers and members
and their participation in the activities of the society.”).
284. See, e.g., Rankin v. Phillippe, 211 A.2d 56, 58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
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statements. Thus, the privilege would have respected both the
church’s right to speech and the defamed victim’s right to a
remedy.
A qualified privilege, like an absolute privilege, protects
285
statements made in certain contexts. Rather than inhibit speech,
these privileges act to encourage it—even when the speech might
286
be defamatory. The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously
stated the elements and effects of qualified privilege:
The law is that a communication, to be privileged, must
be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive,
and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.
When so made in good faith, the law does not imply
malice from the communication itself, as in the ordinary
case of libel. Actual malice must be proved, before there
can be a recovery, and in the absence of such proof the
287
plaintiff cannot recover.
The difference between the two privileges lies in the amount of
protection offered. An absolute privilege bars liability for even
intentionally false statements made with actual malice, while a
qualified privilege bars liability only when the statement is made in
288
In other words, a qualified
good faith and without malice.
289
privilege ceases to act as a safeguard if it is abused.

285. Minke v. City of Minneapolis, 845 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Minn. 2014) (citing
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986)).
286. Id.
287. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 256–57 (Minn.
1980) (quoting Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129
(1899)); see also Ferrell v. Cross, 557 N.W.2d 560, 565 (Minn. 1997); Wirig v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 380 (Minn. 1990).
288. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954).
289. Id. (“[A] qualified or conditional privilege grants immunity only if the
privilege is not abused . . . .”); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 832 (5th ed. 1984) (“[Qualified] immunity is
forfeited if the defendant steps outside of the scope of the privilege, or abuses the
occasion.”). There are four ways in which an actor can abuse this protection. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (citations
omitted) (stating that a qualified privilege may be abused: (1) because of the
publisher’s knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory
matter; (2) because the defamatory matter is published for some purpose other
than that for which the particular privilege is given; (3) because of excessive
publication; or (4) because the publication includes defamatory matter not
reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the
occasion is privileged).
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Indeed, a similar privilege was granted in Minnesota for
290
communications in the context of employment. An example of
this appears in Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., where the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a supervisor forfeited his qualified
privilege when he acted with malice while speaking about the
291
character of his former employee, the plaintiff. The supervisor
had indicated that he was confident in the employee’s capabilities
as a salesperson and that he would give a good recommendation to
292
prospective employers. However, when the supervisor was called
upon to give his recommendation, he referred to the plaintiff as a
293
poor salesperson who was hard to motivate. While the court
recognized that an employer should be able to speak freely while
acting as a reference for a former employee, the court determined
that this freedom ends when the employer undercuts the former
294
employee with malice and bad faith.
The same policy guiding Stuempges should apply in the context
of church disciplinary proceedings. Religious actors should be able
to speak freely about matters of church doctrine and should be
protected when doing so. However, when a harmful claim is made
about a church member that does not implicate religious law or
polity, the claim should be evaluated to determine if it was
defamatory. Applying a qualified privilege in this situation, as the
Minnesota Supreme Court has done in the context of employment,
should help assuage any First Amendment concerns.
The reluctance of the Pfeil majority to extend a qualified
privilege seems to hinge on the possibility that litigation may be
295
prolonged to determine if the privilege was abused. However,
defamation suits are often prolonged in order to make this
296
Determining whether a
abuse/non-abuse determination.
290. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 889–90; Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 256–57 (Minn.
1980); McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 306 Minn. 93, 97, 235 N.W.2d 371, 374
(1975).
291. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258, 260.
292. See id. at 256.
293. See id. at 255.
294. See id at 258.
295. Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church of Unaltered
Augsburg Confession, 877 N.W.2d 528, 540 n.11 (Minn. 2016) (“[D]etermining
whether a statement is entitled to the protection of a qualified privilege requires
extensive litigation.”).
296. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 890
(Minn. 1986); Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258.
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statement is protected by a qualified privilege does not have to be
an extensive, time-consuming ordeal. Minnesota courts already do
297
this in the context of employment. Although there are valid
distinctions between an employment case and a case involving
religious organizations, length of trial is not one of them. The
minimal time it would take to make this determination should not
be used as justification for denying a defamed victim a right to a
remedy.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pfeil, the court was asked to determine whether adjudicating
the Pfeils’ defamation claim would excessively entangle the
government with religion, thereby violating the First
298
Amendment. Although courts have historically been reluctant to
299
extend absolute privileges, the Pfeil court’s affirmation of the
lower courts’ holdings essentially granted a church actor an
absolute privilege to defame in church disciplinary proceedings. To
avoid any possible entanglement issue, it appears the court gave
automatic deference to respondents merely because of their
300
religious connection. The majority failed to use the Odenthal
framework of analyzing each state tort claim on a claim-by-claim

297. See supra notes 290–94 and accompanying text.
298. Pfeil, 877 N.W.2d at 536–37.
299. Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 2010) (“Absolute privilege is
not lightly granted and applies only in limited circumstances.”); see Holzer, supra
note 242, at 572–73.
300. See Magarian, supra note 231, at 1960 (“Absolute judicial avoidance of
inquiries into religious substance, especially if it resulted in a weakened
Establishment Clause, would cross the line that divides appropriate respect for
religious autonomy from inappropriate solicitude for religious claims of
transcendence.”); see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 734 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Milivojevich, Justice
Rehnquist warned of the possible Establishment Clause issues that may arise from
giving automatic deference to religious institutions:
Such blind deference, however, is counseled neither by logic nor by
the First Amendment. To make available the coercive powers of civil
courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical religious
associations, when such deference is not accorded similar acts of
secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free exercise
problems petitioners envision, itself create far more serious problems
under the Establishment Clause.
426 U.S. at 734.
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basis, thereby extending the scope of the ecclesiastical abstention
301
doctrine and undermining the doctrine of stare decisis. The
court should have used neutral principles of law to determine
which statements could be adjudicated without implicating the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.

301. See Connors, supra note 177, at 681; see also Harwood, supra note 31 at
350–51 (“[I]f the Court fails to abide by a single principle in addressing issues
implicating a discrete area of the law, then there will be inconsistency in its
decisions, and its jurisprudence will provide insufficient guidance to future Courts,
lower courts, and policymakers alike.”).
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